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Ab stract
In eval u at ing the mer its and short com ings of vir tue eth ics I fo cus on some
cen tral dif fer ences be tween vir tue eth ics and ri val the o ries such as
deontology and util i tar i an ism. Vir tue eth ics does not pre scribe strict rules of
con duct. In stead, the vir tue eth i cal ap proach can be un der stood as an in vi ta -
tion to search for stan dards, as op posed to strict rules, that ought to guide the
con duct of our in di vid ual lives. This re quires a par tic u lar method. The im por -
tance of this ap proach in pres ent times will be come clear when we in ves ti -
gate the re la tion be tween vir tue eth ics and postmodernity. In our postmodern
age moral con cepts are no lon ger per ceived as de riv ing their mean ing from
larger frame works. In stead, their mean ings are perceived as be ing de rived
from the con tin gen cies that de fine our par tic u lar existences. Thus on go ing
grass roots moral en gage ment is re quired, and vir tue eth ics is the ap pro pri ate
moral frame work for do ing this. This re sults in a broad en ing of ra tio nal ity in -
so far as the full rich ness of our sit u ated lives are fac tored into our ac counts
of ra tio nal ity. At the same time vir tue eth ics pre vents rel a tiv ism, mainly be -
cause it does jus tice to the so cial embeddedness of hu man ac tiv i ties. In or der
to il lus trate the vir tue eth i cal ap proach I will dis cuss two key con cepts in our
moral vo cab u lary: re spon si bil ity and in teg rity. We will see how these ba sic
con cepts can be prop erly un der stood only if one takes into con sid er ation the
con tin gen cies, in her ent par a doxes and ten sions in hu man life.
A young man of twenty-three is phys i cally and men tally ma ture, which is to say that
he has just com menced his ac tive in volve ment in so ci ety. He is, one might say, full of
dreams and ex pec ta tions which are yet to be ful filled.
Much the same can be said about the pro ject started twenty-three years ago by
Alisdair Mac In tyre's Af ter Vir tue. The book is an in trigu ing ex po si tion of all kinds of
in tu itions and in sights, but they de mand fur ther elab o ra tion and elu ci da tion. It turned
out to be the start ing point of what could be char ac ter ized as the 're vi tal iza tion or re -
birth of vir tue eth ics'. This an cient tra di tion had started with Ar is totle and was the
dom i nant eth i cal frame work in Chris tian Me di eval phi los o phy and mo der nity un til Im -
man uel Kant. In the 19th and 20th cen tury vir tue eth ics played a mi nor role. Worth
1 Ad dress for cor re spon dence: Fac ulty of Phi los o phy, Radbout Uni ver sity, 6500 HD Nij megen, The
Neth er lands. I am greatly in debted to Pedro Tabensky (Uni ver sity of Pre to ria) for his stim u lat ing com -
ments and fruit ful sug ges tions.
men tion ing are Scheler (1955), and the pro ject 're ha bil i ta tion of Ar is to te lian prac ti cal
phi los o phy' in Ger many (Bien, 1973, Ritter, 1969). With Mac In tyre's work how ever
vir tue eth ics started re gain ing the ground it lost. Re mark ably most vir tue ethicists
turned to Ar is totle, ap par ently ne glect ing the al most 2000-year-old tra di tion. Only oc -
ca sion ally in spi ra tion was found in the broad tra di tion. The ex pla na tion lies in the fact
that, as we will see, Ar is totle has laid firm foun da tions. The es sence of vir tue eth ics is
al ready pres ent in Ar is totle.
Af ter Mac In tyre the pro ject of re vi tal iz ing vir tue eth ics has been fur ther de vel oped
by many phi los o phers com ing from di verg ing back grounds. Spe cial at ten tion must be
given to the fact that vir tue eth ics has cap tured the imag i na tion of phi los o phers com -
ing from both the an a lytic and con ti nen tal tra di tions, fur ther blur ring the edges be -
tween these two tra di tions. And, as in Ar is totle's prac ti cal phi los o phy, eth ics and po lit -
i cal thought are in ex tri ca bly en tan gled, ethicists and po lit i cal phi los o phers found
them selves be ing de scribed as mem bers of the so-called 'com mu ni tarian' move ment. It
is how ever in one par tic u lar branch of the philo soph i cal tree that the emer gence of vir -
tue eth ics was most prom i nent, namely, the fast grow ing branch of ap plied eth ics.
While twenty-five years ago the con cept of vir tue was hardly pres ent in ap plied eth ics, 
a quick sur vey of re cently pub lished text books and jour nals shows us to what ex tent
vir tue eth ics has in deed be come very in flu en tial.
In this con tri bu tion some mer its and short com ings of the pro ject will be dis cussed. I
will start by pro vid ing a sketch of vir tue eth ics as it has been de vel oped in ap plied eth -
ics, and give some rea sons for its grow ing pop u lar ity. From this sketch a ma jor short -
com ing of the pro ject will be re vealed. In its short his tory ap plied eth ics has been used 
to ad dress all kinds of prac ti cal prob lems, but thor ough meth od olog i cal re flec tion has
been rel a tively scarce. Far to of ten it has hap pened that ap plied ethicists view 'ap plied'
and 'fun da men tal' is sues in di chot o mous terms, thus feel ing jus ti fied in dis re gard ing
deep the o ret i cal is sues. This ten dency to view ap plied and non-ap plied is sues in di -
chot o mous terms has had some im por tant neg a tive con se quences. Prob lems have
emerged par tic u larly with re gard to the is sue of ra tio nal ity. Us ing my ex pe ri ence in
teach ing eth ics to man age ment stu dents, man ag ers and mil i tary of fi cers, I will ar gue
that what could be char ac ter ized as a broad con cep tion of ra tio nal ity is re quired for
mak ing sense of key eth i cal con cepts. It is only when this con cept is elu ci dated that
the prom ises of vir tue eth ics will most fully ma te ri al ize. As con crete ex am ples of the
pro posed method I will deal with two key moral con cepts: re spon si bil ity and in teg rity.
How does virtue ethics work in applied ethics?
For a long time deontology and util i tar i an ism have dom i nated eth i cal de bate.2 As they
stood in di rect op po si tion to one an other they were un der stood as cov er ing the en tire
moral spec trum. A sub stan tial pro por tion of the time spent in courses in eth ics was
ded i cated to deal ing with the ten sion be tween these two lines of thought. Typ i cally,
stu dents were asked to en gage in case stud ies and see how deontological and util i tar -
ian ap proaches lead to con flict ing con clu sions. This ap proach showed stu dents the
rich ness and com plex ity of eth i cal de bate and in do ing so it trained them to make
better moral de ci sions.
That said, a crit i cal glance at this method of teach ing eth ics ought to make us sus pi -
cious of the view that the above-men tioned eth i cal ap proaches cover the en tire eth i cal
spec trum. On closer in spec tion deontology and util i tar i an ism are op posed to each
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other pre cisely be cause they are ex tremes in the same con tin uum. As Heidegger elab o -
rated in his dis cus sion of Nietz sche's crit i cism of Plato, a re jec tion of a po si tion may at 
the same time amount to an ac cep tance of the ra tio nal ity that is at stake (Heidegger,
1961). In deed, Kant ian ism and util i tar i an ism have sev eral core-pre sup po si tions in
com mon. This is not sur pris ing, as they came into be ing in the same his tor i cal pe riod – 
the en light en ment. In spired by the ver tig i nous de vel op ment of sci en tific ra tio nal ity,
which fos tered emo tion ally de tached, that is, im par tial ob ser va tion, en light en ment-phi -
los o phers aimed to for mu late eth i cal laws and pre scrip tions that are uni ver sally valid.
As later de vel op ments in phi los o phy of sci ence would show, this was a rather na ive
ap proach. At this mo ment it is how ever most im por tant to no tice that it was the source
of in spi ra tion for util i tar i an ism and Kantian deontology. The pre scrip tions that re -
sulted from these two the o ries may be dif fer ent yet the un der ly ing ra tio nal ity is the
same.
The cen tral idea of Af ter Vir tue is that en light en ment ra tio nal ity has se ri ous short -
com ings. It pur ports to pro vide firm and im par tial jus ti fi ca tions for good con duct
while in fact pre sup pos ing a te le o log i cal un der stand ing of re al ity (as dis cussed by
Mac In tyre in Mac In tyre 1985:51-61). In vary ing de grees the great phi los o phers of the
En light en ment rec og nized the need for a te le o log i cal frame work for mo ral ity, but their 
suc ces sors did not. The suc ces sors thought that this rec og ni tion was an ar bi trary and
un jus ti fi able con ces sion to views that the great En light en ment think ers them selves had 
al ready re jected. En light en ment mo ral ity's pre ten sions of im par tial ity re sulted in the
de struc tion of the te le o log i cal frame work that, ac cord ing to Mac In tyre, grounds mo ral -
ity. The il lu sion of a firm and im par tial ra tio nal ity re sulted in the o ries with high pre -
ten sions but lack ing the rel e vant foun da tions re quired for mak ing mo ral ity in tel li gi ble
– te le o log i cal foun da tions.
The emer gence of vir tue eth ics amounts to a re vi tal iza tion of the pre-en light en ment
tra di tion of moral re flec tion. This emer gence should have led to meth od olog i cal re -
flec tion which would make the fail ures of En light en ment ra tio nal ity ex plicit and stim -
u late a search for an al ter na tive va ri ety of ra tio nal ity. Un for tu nately Af ter Vir tue
proves to be of lit tle as sis tance with this later task and much the same can be said of
Mac In tyre's Whose Jus tice? Which Ra tio nal ity?. In fact the only meth od olog i cal in di -
ca tion Mac In tyre pro vides can be found in his dis cus sion of the con cept of a prac tice
in Af ter Vir tue. The in tro duc tion of this con cept must be un der stood against the back -
ground of what is prob a bly the main prob lem the pro ject of re ha bil i tat ing vir tue eth ics
faces, Mod ern ism's re jec tion of te le o log i cal frame works.
The Greek word for vir tue, ('aretè') lit er ally means 'able to ful fil its nat u ral task'. Al -
though the Latin equiv a lent 'virtus' is de rived from an other con cept, the mean ing is ba -
si cally the same: a good hu man life con sists in real is ing one's nat u ral func tion (the nat -
u ral func tion be ing the sum-to tal of vir tues). As in the Mod ern era there has been no
con sen sus re gard ing the meta phys i cal frame work that fixes the nat u ral func tion, it
seems im pos si ble for Mod ern think ers to de ter mine the con stit u ents of a hu man life
when it is at its best. In his dis cus sion of the con cept of a 'prac tice' Mac In tyre tries to
show why mo ral ity must be framed within a te le o log i cal frame work. In what is by far
the most quoted pas sage in Mac In tyre's cor pus he de scribes a prac tice as a 'co her ent
and com plex form of so cially es tab lished co-op er a tive hu man ac tiv ity through which
goods in ter nal to that form of ac tiv ity are real ised in the course of try ing to achieve
those stan dards of ex cel lence which are ap pro pri ate to, and par tially de fin i tive of, that
form of ac tiv ity' (Mac In tyre, 1985:187). In the twenty-three years af ter Af ter Vir tue it
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has be come com mon prac tice to speak about the vir tues de vel oped in the prac tice of
jour nal ism (Cassidy, 2001), the prac tice of busi ness (and, as dis cussed by Sol o mon
[1992:160], the vir tues re quired in this prac tice are dif fer ent from those in volved in
play ing poker or gam bling), the prac tice of pub lic ad min is tra tion (Coo per, 1987) and
so on.
Al though it is not al ways ex plic itly stated, vir tue eth ics is sen si tive to the com plex
re la tion ship that ex ists be tween eth i cal the ory and hu man prac tice. Eth i cal the ory can -
not and ought not to pro vide us with fixed stan dards of what is con sid ered to be 'mor -
ally right'. In stead, it pro vides rough guide lines which have the func tion of stim u lat ing 
an on go ing sen si tive en gage ment with the eth i cal di men sions of our daily lives. What
this amounts to be comes plain once we look at the main source of in spi ra tion of vir tue
ethicists – Ar is totle's Eth ics. In the be gin ning of the Nicomachean Eth ics Ar is totle de -
nies the pos si bil ity of pre sent ing fixed uni ver sal rules for con duct. In his words 'We
must there fore be con tent if (...) we suc ceed in pre sent ing a broad out line of the truth;
when our sub ject and our pre mises are merely gen er al i ties, it is enough if we ar rive at
gen er ally valid con clu sions' (Ar is totle, 1990:1094b19-21). For Ar is totle the pri mary
task of eth ics is to un der stand the mean ing it self of moral phe nom ena, and it is only if
we can un der stand this, Ar is totle thinks, that nor ma tive ori en ta tions and a crit i cal ap -
proach to wards hu man ac tion can be es tab lished. The first step to gain ing the rel e vant
sort of un der stand ing is to de ter mine prev a lent un der stand ings of ba sic eth i cal con -
cepts and to de ter mine the sorts of mo ti va tional re sources re quired for act ing mor ally.
So Ar is totle starts his in ves ti ga tion of hap pi ness, cour age, jus tice, prac ti cal wis dom
and other ba sic vir tues with what could be char ac ter ized as an in ven tory of com mon
opin ions. Bas ing him self on this ini tial sur vey he pro ceeds to de velop his own eth i cal
ap proach. One could say that he de vel ops his own views by es tab lish ing a crit i cal di a -
logue with com mon sense. He in quires whether cer tain com mon sense un der stand ings
can be main tained when the un der ly ing mean ings of the rel e vant con cepts are made
ex plicit. He com pares the force of di verse un der stand ings of spe cific eth i cal con cepts
and he ex plores ba sic re la tion ships be tween a pleth ora of eth i cal con cepts with the aim 
of es tab lish ing a co her ent whole. The crit i cal but deeply en gaged Soc ra tes of the early
Pla tonic di a logues is the meth od olog i cal source of in spi ra tion of the Eth ics.3 Anal o -
gously, the sorts of hu man re la tion ships, in clud ing pro fes sional re la tion ships, that
pres ent day vir tue ethicists fos ter are in ti mate, sub tle and dialogical. Peo ple should
aim at un der stand ing the mo ral ity im plicit in day-to-day life and to try to find so lu -
tions to com plex prob lems from this van tage point, rather than at tempt ing to un der -
stand the hu man sit u a tion and ad dress is sues in cur rent so ci ety from a de tached point
of view. This im plies tak ing prev a lent pat terns of rea son ing se ri ously, and de vel op ing
a crit i cal di a logue with spe cific in di vid u als liv ing their lives in spe cific cir cum stances.
From this back ground the im por tance of the vir tue 'phronèsis', that ac com pa nies all
other vir tues, must be un der stood. This vir tue en ables the ac tor to make a con text sen -
si tive judge ment of the sit u a tion (and act ac cord ingly).
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3 Of course there has been a lot of de bate about what ex actly Soc ra tes' moral out look is (and how it re -
lates to the moral prac tices of his fel low Athe nians). It is how ever gen er ally ac knowl edged that the Soc -
ra tes of the early Pla tonic di a logues should be dis tin guished from the Soc ra tes of the later di a logues in
which Plato pres ents his the ory of ideas. In the early di a logues Soc ra tes' hu mour, mock ery and irony are 
signs of will ing ness to start an open dis cus sion (Vlastos, 1991; Zwart, 1996), which sug gests that the
So cratic po si tion in these early di a logues is more closely aligned with Ar is totle's out look.
The dy nam ics be tween pre-given gen eral moral prin ci ples (em bod ied in the vir tues)
and unique sit u a tions is par tic u larly rel e vant in pro fes sional life in mod ern so ci ety.
Con sti tu tive of each pro fes sional prac tice is a set of stan dards that need to be im ple -
mented in con text-sen si tive ways. The dif fer ences be tween dif fer ent pro fes sional prac -
tices are very great. Let me il lus trate this with a brief study of the vir tue of brav ery,
which is con sid ered to be one of the car di nal vir tues by the tra di tion. Pol i ti cians can be 
said to have cour age when they stand firm against the pres sures they meet in re al iz ing
the pub lic good. On the other hand, for a busi ness man cour age amounts to hav ing the
ca pac ity to re sist pres sure to act in ways that do not ac cord with the ba sic moral prin ci -
ples which de fine good busi ness prac tices; pres sure, say, to in crease short-term profit
mar gins by di min ish ing the qual ity of one's prod ucts or by treat ing ones em ploy ees
un fairly. Gen er ally, a crit i cal anal y sis of the vir tues im plicit in spe cific hu man
endeavours will re sult in a height ened un der stand ing of the moral di men sion of those
endeavours. A rel a tively com pre hen sive anal y sis of the vir tues is what is re quired for
un der stand ing the dis tinct mo ral i ties im plicit in the mul ti far i ous char ac ter of our hu -
man en gage ments.
The eth i cal ap proach out lined above con trasts mark edly with the overly pre scrip tive
ten den cies of util i tar i an ism and deontology, yet, un for tu nately, the rise of vir tue eth ics 
in the field of ap plied eth ics has not al ways been suf fi ciently rad i cal and that is largely 
be cause the deep dif fer ences that ex ist be tween vir tue eth ics and its ri vals have not
been suf fi ciently no ticed. The rea son the dif fer ences have not been suf fi ciently no ticed 
is that ap plied ethicists sel dom re flect on is sues per tain ing to meth od ol ogy. Many ap -
plied ethicists seem not to be aware that the shift to vir tue eth ics has se ri ous con se -
quences with re gard to the sort of ra tio nal ity that should be in form ing their dis ci pline.
This is spe cially the case with the heirs of the more pre scrip tive tra di tions, who in sist
on trans par ency and de tach ment. They are in clined to com bine, in un holy mat ri mony,
vir tue eth ics with the nar row ra tio nal ity that takes for mal con sis tency and ob jec tive
truth to be the high est ra tio nal val ues. This un holy mat ri mony re sults in ab stract and
con cep tual anal y ses that do not do jus tice to the het er o ge ne ity and in ner ten sions of
daily mo ral ity.
The search for a suc ces sor to the ideal of de tached objectivism can be in spired by a
dis cus sion of the con tem po rary so cial ethos, namely, the postmodern ethos.
Postmodernism
As postmodernism is by def i ni tion re sist ing clear def i ni tions, I will not even try to de -
scribe it. Partly be cause of postmodernism's ca pri cious and in tan gi ble char ac ter the re -
la tion be tween vir tue eth ics and postmodernism is com pli cated. For us it is im por tant
that vir tue eth ics is able to deal with a ten sion char ac ter is tic of postmodernism. Con -
tem po rary vir tue eth ics of fers an ac count of the eth i cal that takes postmodernism's cri -
tique of En light en ment se ri ously, but it saves the postmodern pro ject from its ni hil is tic 
ten den cies. Ac cord ing to postmodernists, the grand nar ra tives of the En light en ment
are dead. Moral con cepts are no lon ger per ceived as de riv ing their sig nif i cance from
these nar ra tives. Is sues re gard ing moral ori en ta tion, it is now thought, must be re -
solved at grass roots level. This is clearly il lus trated by the re cent re sur gence of con -
cern for the con crete in di vid ual with his con crete and con text spe cific ex is ten tial
strug gles and in ner ten sions. At a pop u lar level, the nu mer ous talk shows that have
emerged around the globe in re cent years show that peo ple are very in ter ested in the
spe cific life-sto ries of in di vid u als and don't get tired of ex chang ing opin ions about
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per sonal be liefs and con vic tions. In the so cial sci ences and the hu man i ties we have
wit nessed a large growth in the num ber of books and ar ti cles deal ing with is sues of
iden tity in a way that places em pha sis on the par tic u lar.
Un der ly ing these pop u lar and not so pop u lar ex changes is a search for a nor ma tive
ori en ta tion. And, clearly, a search pre sup poses that there is some thing that we want
and hope to find. Fur ther more, by def i ni tion, these goal-ori ented searches can not be
un der stood as be ing de ter mined by ar bi trary acts of the will. Af ter all, some thing can
only have mean ing for a per son if it is per ceived by that per son as be ing more than
merely ar bi trary. In mak ing these claims I am not com mit ting my self to claim ing that a 
clear ori en ta tion for our lives will ever be de ter mined. At pres ent I only need to ac -
knowl edge the ba sic for mal fea tures of a search for a nor ma tive ori en ta tion.
In deed, it is be cause postmodernists re ject grand meta-nar ra tives, which of fer con -
text neu tral – pre-pack aged – moral ori en ta tions, that they have to spend much en ergy
in their quest for a mean ing ful ori en ta tion. But, with postmodernism also co mes the
threat of a dev as tat ing form of cyn i cism – of per ni cious rel a tiv ism. The em pha sis on
dif fer ence and di ver sity is of ten ac com pa nied by a cer tain in ca pac ity to grap ple with
the idea of a mean ing ful nor ma tive ori en ta tion – a kind of ni hil ism. From a meth od -
olog i cal point of view those postmodernists who em brace a ni hil is tic stance to wards
the moral are, in ad ver tently, align ing them selves with En light en ment think ing which
they pur port to re ject. They do so in that, by tak ing up a ni hil is tic stance, they jump to
what could be char ac ter ized as an im par tial, con text in sen si tive con clu sion about the
nor ma tive ori en ta tion we should adopt, namely that all pre ten sions to truth, and to
truth re gard ing moral ori en ta tion par tic u larly, should be abol ished. Closely re lated to
this ni hil is tic ten dency is the ten dency to think that all moral judge ments are mor al is tic 
at tacks on in di vid ual free dom. That said, in re cent years it has gen er ally been ac -
knowl edged that ex treme rel a tiv ism is a se ri ous prob lem. This aware ness led to what
could be char ac ter ized as the 'eth i cal turn' in the phi los o phy of the re cent years. It is
not sur pris ing that vir tue eth ics came into vogue with this turn, since it of fers a so lu -
tion to the ni hil is tic ten den cies of some postmodernists while at the same time avoid -
ing the rigid pre scrip tive ten den cies of En light en ment mo ral ity. With vir tue eth ics the
con crete in di vid ual, as op posed to the con text neu tral En light en ment sub ject, came to
oc cupy cen tre stage.
The emer gence of vir tue eth ics has been fa cil i tated by a shift in our un der stand ings
of ra tio nal ity; a shift from Mod ern to Postmodern con cep tions. More spe cif i cally, the
postmodern shift from uni ver sal ism to particularism is the pri mary el e ment re spon si ble 
for the re con fig u ra tion of our con cep tions of ra tio nal ity. Mak ing the rich ness and the
ten sions of sit u ated in di vid u als more ex plicit has brought with it a move away from a
fo cus on for mal con sis tency and ab strac tion and to wards a broader con cep tion of ra -
tio nal ity which com ple ments vir tue eth ics very well. In deed, one could say that the
postmodern con cep tion of ra tio nal ity has pro vided the ideal soil for vir tue eth ics to
flour ish.4
The re la tion ship that ex ists be tween vir tue eth ics and postmodernism is clearly vis i -
ble in an arena where ap plied eth ics has done a lot of work – the pro fes sional arena.
Or ga ni za tions have un der gone tran si tions that could be de scribed in terms of a shift
from mo der nity to postmodernity. Mod ern pro fes sional or ga ni za tions used to be struc -
tured ac cord ing to the bu reau cratic model of Max Weber. In this model in di vid u als are 
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De Wachter (1993) ar gues along these lines.
given fixed roles and task de scrip tions, and com mu ni cate with each other in ac cor -
dance with clearly de fined for mal pro ce dures. Pro fes sional or ga ni za tions were struc -
tured in ac cor dance with clear hi er ar chies. In rel a tively sta ble en vi ron ments this mod -
ern model has proven to be very ef fec tive in deal ing with com pli cated prob lems that
re quire highly spe cial ised skills. And, I might add, west ern bu reau cra cies to a large
ex tent still em body this model, but the tides are chang ing, and they have been do ing so 
for the past de cade. The new postmodern model is char ac ter ized by much more flex i -
bil ity, in de pend ence and free dom in the work place. The model in vites in di vid u als to
be come more aware of the dy namic con text in which they op er ate and it is for this rea -
son that the new postmodern or ga ni za tion is char ac ter ized by shift ing re la tions and
fluid task de scrip tions. The idea of a net work, as op posed to the an ti quated idea of a
pyr a mid, is now be com ing the lead ing met a phor in the for ma tion of pro fes sional or ga -
ni za tions (Coo per, 1998; Dubbink 1999; Frissen, 1996).
With changes in or ga ni za tional struc tures new ques tions and new de mands arise.
Pro fes sion als are no lon ger en cour aged to see them selves as small cogs in a grand ma -
chine that moves in ac cor dance with fixed prin ci ples that fully de ter mine ac tion. In -
stead, they are now en cour aged to see them selves as agents proper who are gen u inely
re spon si ble for their ac tions (I will fur ther dis cuss the con cept of re spon si bil ity be -
low). How ever, de spite the im por tance given to the rich and var ied ex pe ri ences of in -
di vid u als, it is still of cru cial im por tance that pro fes sion als un der stand their pro fes -
sional ac tiv i ties in re la tion ship to an over all in sti tu tional ori en ta tion that gives pur pose 
and mean ing to their spe cific ac tiv i ties. This new ori en ta tion can not be de scribed in
terms of rigid pre scrip tions. Rather, only gen eral guide lines, rules of thumb, can be
spec i fied, and these guide lines in vite in di vid ual pro fes sion als to ex press their own
unique ness in the task of fur ther ing the goals of the in sti tu tions for which they work.
Vir tue eth ics is well equipped for deal ing with the pro cesses that take place in these
new or ga ni za tional struc tures.
Let me sub stan ti ate these last claims with an ex am ple taken from my ex pe ri ence as a 
guest lec turer in the Dutch Royal Na val Acad emy. In the 90's the Dutch army was in -
volved in a num ber of peace keep ing op er a tions. In op er a tions of this sort sol diers face
all kinds of moral di lem mas. To sup port the de vel op ment of eth i cal skills, an ed u ca -
tion pro gram was set up. It started with two the o ret i cal lec tures, af ter which mil i tary
of fi cers with di rect ex pe ri ence in peace keep ing op er a tions are given the op por tu nity to 
ex plain how they have dealt with the moral co nun drums pre sented to them. In what is
re ferred to as a 'So cratic in ter ro ga tion' ses sion young mid ship men are in vited to ad -
dress ques tions to the par tic i pat ing of fi cers. This prac ti cal com po nent of the course,
where of fi cers were given the floor, was of par tic u lar in ter est to pu pils. In the ac counts 
pro vided by the of fi cers, the o ret i cal anal y ses was thin, but this is not to say that all
they were do ing was pro vid ing mere in for mal sto ries in volv ing lit tle more than dis -
joint an ec dotes. In stead, they pre sented co her ent sto ries that in te grated the de ci sions
be ing made on the ground into the larger nar ra tive that was un fold ing in the war torn
re gions where troops were de ployed. The mo ti va tions and char ac ters of the of fi cers
spoke di rectly to the pu pils and the sto ries be stowed sense, grasp able by most, upon
the ac tions and de ci sions that were taken in mor ally chal leng ing cir cum stances. To be
sure, in this pro cess of moral ed u ca tion de tached the o ret i cal anal y ses may also have a
role to play. The of fi cers ex plain their mo ti va tion and re late their be hav iour to stan -
dards that ev ery sol dier ought to know. Ab stract con cepts such as hu man rights, the
core-con cepts of the codes of con duct and con cepts such as dig nity, util ity and duty
are use ful for mak ing sense of grass roots in volve ments with mor ally dif fi cult sit u a -
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tions. But, and this is a cru cial point, these con cepts on their own do not suf fice for ex -
plain ing the de ci sions made on the ground, nor do they pro vide us with all that is re -
quired for mak ing ef fec tive moral de ci sions. Al though ab stract con cepts play an im -
por tant role in help ing us make sense of cer tain events, it is in the sto ries that were told 
that the full mean ings of the de ci sions and ac tions were com mu ni cated. In deed, nar ra -
tives are the pri mary source of moral knowl edge and mean ing. The sort of knowl edge
ex pressed by the ex pe ri enced of fi cers can not be grasped by means of the o ret i cal anal -
y ses from a de tached and 'neu tral' van tage point. On the con trary, a re fusal to un der -
stand a given sit u a tion by means of rich nar ra tive, trumps any at tempt to prop erly un -
der stand the moral di men sion of their ac tions.
This ex am ple makes it clear that good moral ac tion re quires a dy namic be tween gen -
eral ideas and par tic u lar sit u a tions. The start ing point is a broad frame work of moral
guide lines. In the army there is con sen sus about ba sic moral stan dards and these stan -
dards ul ti mately re fer back to gen eral stan dards that ought to guide so ci ety at large.
How ever, spe cific em bodi ments of these gen eral stan dards can only prop erly be un -
der stood if one un der stands the nar ra tives within which they are nested.
A deeper un der stand ing of the eth i cal di men sion of our lives is pos si ble when we
ana lyse con crete cir cum stances by us ing what can be de scribed as a nar ra tive logic. It
is only with this sort of 'logic' that we can make sense of how the dif fer ent parts of our 
lives, which are be ing played out in un fold ing cir cum stances, are re lated to one an -
other, thus form ing a co her ent whole. It be comes clear that nar ra tive logic can not be
the same as the logic de ployed in the sci ences. In deed, ba sic stan dards of co her ence
in form both modes of un der stand ing, but the set of stan dards used to un der stand our
lives is very dif fer ent from the set used in sci en tific in quiry. The co her ence of a nar ra -
tive is much broader. Its aim is not so much con sis tency as it is hold ing a field of ten -
sions to gether – ten sions which form an in her ent part of liv ing as hu man be ings.
Aware ness of the sort of nar ra tive logic or ra tio nal ity that informs our lives has been 
en hanced and, relatedly, the the o ries that are meant to ex plain this form of ra tio nal ity
have ex pe ri enced sig nif i cant de vel op ment since the ap pear ance of Af ter Vir tue. But
much work still re mains to be done, par tic u larly with re gard to our un der stand ings of
the com plex ma trix of moral mo ti va tions, the in ner ten sions in our daily lives and the
vir tues that are re quired for op er at ing at our best in pro fes sional and non-pro fes sional
spheres. In or der to do this work well, the prac ti cal phi los o pher has to con sider the
moral do main from what could be char ac ter ised as an in ter nal per spec tive. As the ex -
am ple from the Royal Na val Acad emy il lus trates, the mean ing of par tic u lar vir tues and 
val ues can be un der stood prop erly not from a de tached van tage point but, rather, from
the point of view of some one who is di rectly and in ti mately com mit ted to a spe cific set 
of ex is ten tial endeavours. This of course does not mean that one can not be crit i cal
about cer tain as pects of how peo ple go about the busi ness of liv ing, not at all. One can 
be crit i cal, but one can only be crit i cal if one has an in volved un der stand ing of the
moral con cepts that are at stake. When mak ing a moral move one must take into con -
sid er ation all sorts of com pet ing ten sions that are unique to spe cific cir cum stances.
Elaboration of concepts
Af ter this plea to deal di rectly with the moral mo ti va tions of pro fes sion als it would be
in con sis tent to con fine our selves merely to meta-level anal y ses. Con crete ex am ples
will help to clar ify is sues, so I have cho sen to deal with the is sues of re spon si bil ity and 
in teg rity. These are core con cepts in cur rent eth i cal de bate. As they are not pres ent on
the list of clas si cal vir tues, it is a chal lenge for pres ent-day vir tue ethicists to re write
them in their vo cab u lary.
274 S. Afr. J, Philos. 2004, 23(3)
Responsibility5
When a mis de meanor oc curs in pro fes sional cir cles a search for a re spon si ble party
typ i cally en sues. Those search ing for a re spon si ble party are typ i cally in ter ested in is -
sues of ac count abil ity and li a bil ity. It is not hard to see why this is the case. Some one
is ac count able or li a ble in so far as he has not acted in a re spon si ble way. Triv i ally, a
per son who has be haved ir re spon si bly is one who has done some thing that he should
not have done, or he did not do some thing he should have done. The ques tion one
might be tempted to ask at this point is 'What are the qual i ties re quired for count ing as
a re spon si ble agent?'.
Pe ter Strawson ar gues that peo ple are re spon si ble when they are free, pos sess power
and have knowl edge of the rel e vant sit u a tion (Strawson, 1962; see also Ben Ze'ev,
2000). In deed, a large vol ume of lit er a ture deal ing with the is sue of re spon si bil ity ad -
dress the cri te ria listed by Strawson. At the fore front are ques tions such as, 'Can we
blame in di vid u als for act ing out of ig no rance?', 'How far do in di vid ual pow ers ex -
tend?', and 'To what ex tent are peo ple free?' (con sider the re spon si bil ity-de ter min ism
de bate). Al though it is clear that Strawson's list is im por tant in de ter min ing who is re -
spon si ble, his cri te ria do no more than scratch the sur face of the con cept of re spon si -
bil ity. In or der to have a proper grasp of the rel e vant con cept one must pos sess an un -
der stand ing of the moral qual i ties re spon si ble in di vid u als em body. Only a proper de -
scrip tion of re spon si bil ity, un der stood as a qual ity of char ac ter, al lows us to place the
ba sic list of con cepts men tioned by Strawson into proper fo cus.
Re spon si ble sub jects are just those sorts of sub jects in so far as they di rect them selves 
to wards ob jects of re spon si bil ity. They di rect their care and at ten tion to wards ob jects
of re spon si bil ity. But, what mo ti vates a per son to act caringly and at ten tively? A con -
vic tion that the ob ject at stake is of some value – that there is a good that ought to be
re al ized. In deed, at times peo ple bear ing heavy re spon si bil i ties go so far as to con sider 
them selves to be sub ser vi ent to the goods that are at stake. These brief com ments have 
im pli ca tions with re gard to the is sue of per sonal iden tity. A re spon si ble in di vid ual
tends to de rive quite a lot of sat is fac tion from his re spon si bil i ties in so far as he iden ti -
fies with his work. His re ply to ques tions such as 'Who am I?' will typ i cally in volve
point ing out how im por tant and valu able his work is. In cases where this iden ti fi ca tion 
is com pletely ab sent, peo ple suf fer from an of ten hard to bear es trange ment or alien -
ation from their work.
A re spon si ble agent is not merely one who has good in ten tions. He is able to act in
an ap pro pri ate man ner, and act ing in this man ner in volves hav ing the right sorts of ca -
pac i ties, ex per tise and knowl edge that will al low him to act in a fully com mit ted fash -
ion, par tic u larly when the go ing gets rough. In deed, the con cept of re spon si bil ity be -
comes a par tic u larly use ful one for de scrib ing hu man ac tion pre cisely when ac tions do 
not con form to strict rules and pre scrip tions, and this hap pens par tic u larly when com -
plex and un ex pected cir cum stances call for dif fi cult and cre ative so lu tions. The re -
spon si ble agent is one who is at ten tive to un ex pected oc cur rences and who is pre pared 
to sort out, in a cre ative fash ion, how to ad ju di cate be tween com pet ing moral de mands 
in the work place and else where.
I might fur ther add that one can not be come re spon si ble by a sim ple act of the will.
Rather, like any other com plex at ti tude, one must ac quire the rel e vant hab its or at ti -
tudes through ha bit u a tion. This is in deed some thing Ar is totle has taught us in his dis -
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5 A more de tailed ver sion of this anal y sis can be found in Becker, 2002.
cus sion of how the vir tu ous hab its are ac quired. The hab its are ac quired through an
on go ing en gage ment with the com plex cir cum stances within which our lives, in clud -
ing our pro fes sional lives, are played out. In the ini tial stages of their pro fes sional
lives nov ices ex pe ri ence many ex ter nally im posed ob li ga tions. As time goes by vir tu -
ous hab its are de vel oped, which is to say that the un der ly ing val ues and prin ci ples that 
de fine good prac tice within a given pro fes sional sphere have been in ter nal ized. Of
course this re quires a rel a tively sta ble so cial en vi ron ment that stim u lates the per son.
Ha bit u a tion only suc ceeds if there are good ex am ples in the neigh bour hood, if the per -
son is pun ished when he does wrong, and good ac tions are re warded.
The rel e vance of spe cific so cial en vi ron ments for vir tue be comes even clearer when
we look at the sig nif i cance of spe cific pro fes sional ac tiv i ties. Es sen tial to this pro cess
of de vel op ing the right sorts of pro fes sional hab its is the de vel op ment of a height ened
aware ness of the mean ing of one's pro fes sional ac tiv i ties. The sig nif i cance in ques tion
is de rived from an un der stand ing of the larger frame work from which one's spe cific
pro fes sional en gage ments are nested. To be sure, sin gle-minded pro fes sion als en gaged 
in their nar rowly de fined pur suits might count as re spon si ble ac tors, but only if their
nar row pur suits pre sup pose an im plicit un der stand ing of the role their pur suits play
within the larger whole which con sti tutes their com pany or, in deed, the so cial or der
within which their pro fes sional ac tiv i ties are car ried out. As long as, at some level,
peo ple real ise that their work de rives mean ing within a larger sphere of sig nif i cance,
and as long as they act in ac cor dance with this un der stand ing, they will be act ing as re -
spon si ble agents. They are not solely fo cused on their own nar rowly de fined con cerns, 
but are able to in cor po rate con sid er ations per tain ing to the over all sphere of moral
con cerns within which their nar row field of con cerns is nested. By con trast, a sin -
gle-minded pro fes sional who has lit tle or no in ter est in how his ac tiv i ties are em bed -
ded within a greater whole, is in dan ger of un der min ing the frame work that be stows
mean ing upon his ac tiv i ties.
Deal ing with the prac tice of pub lic ad min is tra tion can help elu ci date the dan gers
men tioned above. It is widely rec og nized that pub lic ad min is tra tors have to deal with
many com pet ing in ter ests. Sev eral the o ries have been de vel oped to help them de cide
which in ter ests to priv i lege. In their de sire to solve con flicts some the o ret i cal ap -
proaches ne glect a fun da men tal ten sion. On the one hand, the pub lic ad min is tra tor has
to de fend the in ter ests of his de part ment or or ga ni za tion against al ter na tive in ter est
groups and other de part ments. On the other hand, he should al ways be mo ti vated by a
gen eral un der stand ing of the pub lic good which forms the back drop of his nar rowly
de fined set of in ter ests. This ten sion be tween nar row and wide con cerns is at the heart
of ad min is tra tive prac tices. Ig nor ing this ten sion di min ishes one's un der stand ing of the 
moral di men sion of one's work.
In this treat ment of re spon si bil ity sev eral is sues have emerged that can not be un der -
stood in terms of a ra tio nal ity that priv i leges for mal con sis tency and shuns con tra dic -
tion and con flict gen er ally. In stead, we can only prop erly un der stand re spon si bil ity in
re la tion to the broader un der stand ing of ra tio nal ity dis cussed above.
Moral Integrity
Fol low ing the fi nan cial scan dals of the past de cade a multidisciplinary de bate has
arisen re gard ing moral in teg rity in the work place. That said, it is not en tirely clear
what the con tri bu tions of phi los o phy could be to this de bate. One, af ter all, does not
have to be a phi los o pher to know that things like steal ing and cheat ing are bad and,
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also, arm chair phi los o phers are hardly the best peo ple to give ad vice to peo ple work -
ing on the ground. Per haps one area where phi los o phers can make a sig nif i cant con tri -
bu tion is in the area of 'in teg rity train ing'. It is in this area where a min i mal un der -
stand ing of spe cific work en vi ron ments and philo soph i cal acu men can come in handy.
Such an un der stand ing of the role in teg rity plays in the work en vi ron ment can be
deep ened with the help of the fast de vel op ing in teg rity-de bate found in re cent philo -
soph i cal lit er a ture. And, I might add, it is in the rapid de vel op ment of this de bate that
the need for a broad un der stand ing of ra tio nal ity has be come most ev i dent.
'In teg rity' de rives from a Latin word mean ing 'whole ness' or 'unity' as op posed to be -
ing frag mented, split or de stroyed. It is im por tant to note that the con cept of in teg rity
has come to play a prom i nent role in our times. In pres ent-day so ci ety peo ple work ing
in larger in sti tu tions stand in the mid dle ground of many ten sions. The pub lic-pri vate
dis tinc tion that lies at the heart of mod ern or ga ni za tional cul ture is sup ple mented by
sev eral other ten sions that char ac ter ize the pres ent-day 'net work or ga ni za tion'. Much
more than in the mono lithic hi er ar chi cally or ga nized in sti tu tions, pro fes sion als face di -
ver gent de mands com ing from many di rec tions. The emer gence of the con cept 'in teg -
rity' sug gests that a cer tain va ri ety of un eas i ness and a long ing for unity arises from
the di ver sity and het er o ge ne ity that typ i fies pro fes sional life.
What does 'in teg rity' mean in the pres ent con text? For a long time the an swer was
given in far too nar row terms. The per son of in teg rity was un der stood as the per son
who com plies with fixed min i mum stan dards. These min i mum re quire ments could be
de scribed in ex haus tive terms and they were readily universalizable. In short, a per son
with in teg rity was con sid ered to be hon est, re li able and truth ful. The the o ret i cal frame -
work un der ly ing this in ter pre ta tion is clearly Kantian (Carter, 1996). It is very dif fi cult 
to come to em body these qual i ties, but re flec tion on them is not in tel lec tu ally chal -
leng ing, and it is for this rea son that in tel lec tual de bate on in teg rity was lim ited.
How ever, re cent de bates among schol ars have taught us that the deontological un -
der stand ing of in teg rity is far too nar row. It is much eas ier to un der stand the rich im -
pli ca tions of the con cept of in teg rity if one un der stands that in teg rity is not a mat ter of
com par ing in di vid ual acts with ab stract moral prin ci ples. In or der to un der stand the
con cept we must an a lyze what it means to be a per son of in teg rity. The emer gence of
this con vic tion mir rors the im por tant par a digm shift dis cussed above. First, a per son
who hon estly and sin cerely makes cer tain claims, but changes her mind daily, can not
prop erly be un der stood as pos sess ing in teg rity. At times com pli ance with min i mum
stan dards goes hand-in-hand with in co her ent and cha otic be hav iour and we do not de -
scribe peo ple act ing in such a way as pos sess ing in teg rity. In teg rity has to do with the
way spe cific seg ments of be hav iour fit into the pat tern of a life un der stood as a whole.
In teg rity in volves con stancy of char ac ter. Sec ond, the deontological in ter pre ta tion
faces se ri ous prob lems be cause it im plies that there are fixed stan dards and clear dis -
tinc tions. How ever, in ev ery day lan guage we talk about per sons hav ing more or less
in teg rity. So in teg rity can not be ana lysed in re la tion to a fixed set of rigid stan dards
peo ple are meant to com ply with.
Fol low ing these crit i cal com ments on the con cept of in teg rity nar rowly con ceived, a
rich and var ied philo soph i cal de bate has en sued in which in teg rity, more of ten than
not, has come to be un der stood as a char ac ter trait. Whether or not ex plic itly stated,
most au thors de scribe a per son con sis tently faith ful to his com mit ments as one who
has in teg rity (Calhoun, 1995; Cox, 2003). John Kekes makes use of MacIntyres's anal -
y sis of the con cept of a prac tice to an a lyze the no tion of in teg rity. He de scribes a per -
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son of in teg rity as faith ful to his com mit ments and not se duced by ex ter nal goods such 
as mon e tary gain, sta tus and power (Kekes, 1983). In teg rity, of the sort that Kekes de -
scribes, re quires a strong char ac ter, mean ing that be ing com mit ted in a way that im -
plies hav ing in teg rity is di rectly re lated to a per son's de sire to lead a mean ing ful life.
As men tioned above, the re cent de vel op ments in our un der stand ings of in teg rity im -
ply a broader un der stand ing of ra tio nal ity than the one pro vided by the en light en ment.
Within this broader frame work emo tional at tach ments are not as clearly dis tin guished
from ra tio nal de lib er a tion. Di verg ing and an ti thet i cal com mit ments can now be un der -
stood as form ing part of a struc tured whole. A per son with in teg rity is one who is
prop erly able to man age a com plex net work of di ver gent com mit ments and to bring
co her ence to his con vic tions and ac tions. In teg rity can not prop erly be un der stood in
iso la tion from the com mit ments that are con sti tu tive of a life story, but it must be un -
der stood as an at ti tude that brings unity to a com plex ma trix of di verg ing el e ments.
A con crete ex am ple of the need for a broader ra tio nal ity is given by Mi chael Walzer 
in his fa mous 'dirty hands' ar ti cle (Walzer, 1972). He de scribes a pol i ti cian who stead -
fastly op poses the co lo nial war his coun try is in volved in, and wins the elec tions with
the prom ise of de col o ni za tion and peace. He goes to the co lo nial cap i tal to open ne go -
ti a tions with the re bels, and is con fronted with the fol low ing dif fi cult de ci sion: “he is
asked to au tho rize the tor ture of a cap tured re bel leader, who knows or prob a bly
knows the lo ca tion of a num ber of bombs hid den in apart ment build ings around the
city, set to go off within the next twenty-four hours. He or ders the man tor tured (...)
even though he be lieves that tor ture is wrong, in deed abom i na ble, not just some times
but al ways. He has ex pressed this be lief of ten and an grily dur ing his own cam paign;
the rest of us took it as a sign of his good ness. How should we re gard him now?”
Walzer de fends the pol i ti cian's de ci sion to tor ture. The pol i ti cian is a sin cerely com -
mit ted man who in ev i ta bly has to get his hands dirty. In ex plain ing the dirty hands
con cept Walzer makes a cru cial claim: “It is im por tant to stress that we don't want just
any one to make the deal; we want him to make the deal, pre cisely he has scru ples
about it.” It is tempt ing to un der stand Walzer's con clu sion in quan ti ta tive terms. In
such an in ter pre ta tion the pol i ti cian has not lost his in teg rity in so far as the many good
deeds he has done and the many pos i tive en dur ing com mit ments he has made are not
out weighed by his de ci sion to tor ture. Many util i tar i ans think along these lines, as if
mo ral ity were pri mar ily a mat ter of cal cu la tion: when a cer tain amount of good deeds
are re al ized, a mis take is per mit ted. This in ter pre ta tion misses the point. The es sence
of mo ral ity is not a cal cu la tion ef fected by weigh ing up pro's and con's. Walzer em -
pha sizes that it is just be cause the per son has done well in the past that we want him to 
take this de ci sion. The good ness of his pre vi ous acts di rectly in flu ences our eval u a tion 
of cur rent acts. Note that util i tar ian con sid er ations would lead to sim i lar con clu sions
re gard ing the choice to tor ture, but util i tar ian con sid er ations would not give us
grounds to trust the pol i ti cian. A util i tar ian ap proach would only al low us to judge the
iso lated de ci sion miss ing the deeper moral di men sion of the case. A ra tio nal ity that
goes fur ther than mere cal cu la tion is re quired for mak ing sense of the pol i ti cian's ac -
tions.
Conclusion
The emer gence of vir tue eth ics must be ac com pa nied by a meth od olog i cal shift, and
the need for this shift is not al ways es tab lished ex plic itly in the lit er a ture. A de tached
ethic that aims at com plete trans par ency and pre scrip tive rules must make room for an
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ap proach that aims at un der stand ing the un der ly ing moral com plex i ties in volved in
pro fes sional life. On the ba sis of this un der stand ing, nor ma tive guide lines can be pro -
vided, but not in terms of fixed rules. In stead, and as Ar is totle al ready showed us in
the Nicomachean Eth ics, hu man ac tion can best be un der stood in terms of ide als – ba -
sic nor ma tive point ers. This sort of ap proach to wards eth ics re quires a broader ra tio -
nal ity. It is pos si ble to de ter mine three ba sic char ac ter is tics that de fine this broader un -
der stand ing. First, im pli cated in our proper un der stand ing of ba sic eth i cal con cepts is
the need to es tab lish dialogical re la tion ships with moral sub jects in or der to be able to
make sense of their ac tions from an 'in ter nal per spec tive'. Eth ics has to in ves ti gate the
con tent of peo ple's moral mo ti va tions and moral ex pe ri ences. The whole spec trum of
hu man thoughts and emo tions must be taken into con sid er ation. In this task the her me -
neu tic and phenomenological tra di tions are im por tant sources of in spi ra tion.6 More -
over, in ex plor ing the full rich ness and com plex ity of sit u ated hu man ac tion,
postmodernism has made us more acutely aware of the ten sions that ex ist in our lives.
The re quired ra tio nal ity is not the sort that im plies rigid con sis tency but, rather, the
sort that is guided by the prin ci ples that de fine nar ra tive co her ence. For in stance, one
must be sen si tive to the ten sions that emerge be tween the moral de mands re quired for
per form ing a given task and the de mands of the large in sti tu tional frame work within
which a given task is car ried out. We can only fully make sense of the moral sta tus of
a given sub ject's ac tions if we come to un der stand the man ner in which they deal with
ten sions such as the one just men tioned. At times moral prin ci ples com pete with one
an other and it is the mark of a re spon si ble agent to know how to ad ju di cate be tween
com pet ing de mands. The third ba sic fea ture that de fines broad ra tio nal ity is that it
does not sug gest a sharp di chot omy be tween rea son and emo tion. As we have seen in
the treat ment of re spon si bil ity in pro cesses of moral de vel op ment, rea son and emo tion
in flu ence each other. Ar is totle's rich moral psy chol ogy teaches us that vir tue is de vel -
oped in the in ter ac tion of ‘lo gos’ and emo tions.
Once it has been shown that the sort of ra tio nal ity re quired for un der stand ing hu man 
ac tion is broad rather than nar row, it is pos si ble to make a few re marks about a re -
proach of ten made against vir tue eth ics (and communitarianism), namely, that these
moral out looks en tail rel a tiv ism. They would be char ac ter ized by an in abil ity to pres -
ent fixed moral stan dards. First, this re proach tends to ne glect or deny the em pha sis
that is laid on the so cial embeddedness of vir tues. Mac In tyre's con cept of prac tice pre -
sup poses this embeddedness. We have also wit nessed the im por tance of it in the dis -
cus sion of the con cept re spon si bil ity. There is more over an im por tant mis un der stand -
ing con cern ing the con cept ‘per sonal’. Vir tue eth i cal the ory is highly per sonal in the
sense that it ex plores the many-sided psy chol ogy of hu man mo ti va tion in depth. It is
how ever not per sonal in the sense that it ar gues for in di vid u als that fol low their ar bi -
trary will. In this re spect it dis putes the ex tremes of postmodernity. An other prob lem
of the rel a tiv ism-re proach is its sug ges tion that the black and white dis tinc tion be -
tween true and false is ap pro pri ate in moral mat ters.7 The back ground of this sug ges -
tion is a long tra di tion in An glo-Saxon thought about the sta tus of moral claims. Ex -
treme po si tions such as Mackie's rel a tiv ism and Moore's re al ism have come out of this
tra di tion. As with the op po si tion be tween deontology and util i tar i an ism, the op po si tion 
be tween truth and fal sity is one be tween two ex tremes on the same con tin uum. At -
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6 The re quired method is splen didly de vel oped as a 'her me neu tic eth ics' in Van Tongeren, 1994.
7 It is strik ing how many postmodernists in de ny ing the pos si bil ity of moral stan dards con firm this di chot -
omy. In this re spect they are in the same line of think ing as mod ern di chot o mous ra tio nal ity.
tempt ing to un der stand moral claims as be ing ei ther true of false does not do jus tice to
the na ture of mo ral ity. The true/false di chot omy may have its mer its in those dis ci -
plines that are in spired by the pre ten sions of ob jec tiv ity of En light en ment ra tio nal ity.
But par tic u larly in the field of hu man ac tion a rigid use of this di chot omy will lead us
to a dead end. To con sider moral phe nom ena from a com pletely ex ter nal van tage
point, and con clude that ev ery moral state ment is ei ther true or false, is the wrong way
to go about the busi ness of un der stand ing mo ral ity. An eth i cist should not search for
ev er last ing prin ci ples but, rather, he ought to aim at deep en ing his moral sen si bil i ties
in or der to be able to un der stand how moral con cepts get played out in our daily lives.
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